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Abstract
We model a dynamic monopoly with environmental externalities,
investigating the adoption of a tax levied on the firm’s instantaneous
contribution to the accumulation of pollution. The latter process is
subject to a shock, which is i.i.d. across instants. We prove the
existence of an optimal tax rate such that the monopoly replicates
the same steady state welfare level as under social planning. Yet,
the corresponding output level, R&D investment for environmental
friendly technologies and surplus distribution necessarily differ from
the socially optimal ones.
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1 Introduction
A lively debate is currently taking place on the need to preserve the envi-
ronment from the negative consequences of pollution generated by industrial
activities.1 A crucial aspect is the lack of incentives on the part of profit-
seeking firms to carry out R&D projects to generate new environmental-
friendly technologies.
To this effect, policy makers may adopt several forms of regulation and
taxation/subsidization policies to induce firms to internalise externalities and
invest accordingly. The standard approach to this problem consists in in-
troducing a Pigouvian tax or subsidy rule whereby firms pay or receive an
amount of money proportional to the aggregate current stock of pollutants
generated by the industry as a whole. We propose an alternative policy de-
sign, where the tax is levied on the marginal contribution to the accumulation
process followed by pollution. Accordingly, this policy is close in spirit to
the adoption of a quality standard, such as the use of filters capturing CO2,
in order to decrease the amount of pollutants emitted by a car per mile.
We evaluate this perspective in a simple optimal control model where the
market is monopolistic. To add a realistic feature to our framework, we allow
for the presence of a stochatic shock affecting the accumulation of pollution,
in such a way that the resulting optimal tax rate depends on the expected
value of the shock. Our main result is that there exists a tax policy (i)
inducing the firm to invest in R&D for a greener technology and (ii) yielding
the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. However,
the two allocations characterising, respectively, the regulated monopoly and
the first best differ under all remaining respects, i.e., price, output, R&D
investment and surplus distribution.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is laid
out in section 2. Section 3 contains the analysis of the regulated monopoly.
the first best allocation is described in section 4, while section 5 investigates
the optimal design of taxation. Concluding remarks are in section 6.
2 The setup
Consider a monopolistic single-product firm facing the instantaneous demand
function p(t) = a − q(t), where a > 0 is the reservation price and q(t) ∈
1For an exhaustive account, see Stern (2007) and Jørgensen et al. (2009).
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[0, a− c] is the output level. The production cost is linear in q(t) with unit
cost c ∈ (0, a). The production process involves a negative environmental
externality S(t), that accumulates according to the dynamics
S˙(t) = b(t)q(t)− δS(t)
θ(t)
. (2.1)
This evolutionary structure features a depreciation rate δ > 0, which is also
affected by a stochastic shock in its slope, in the form of a random variable
θ(t), i.i.d. over time, with mean E(θ) = 1 and variance V ar(θ) = σ2θ >
1. For future reference, we define the mean of the reciprocal as E(θ−1) =
w > 1, by Jensen’s inequality.2 The assumption that the dynamics of the
stock of pollution is subject to shocks has been introduced to capture the
idea, largely discussed in the current debate on global warming and the
anthropic responsibility in its evolution, that our knowledge of this matter
is still incomplete and subject to natural factors beyond human control. In
particular, our way of modelling (2.1) refers to uncertainty affecting measures
of the rate at which the atmosphere can absorb and eliminate CO2-equivalent
emissions, especially if one takes into account deforestation.3
To create an incentive for the monopolist to invest in R&D so as to
make its productive technology more environmental-friendly, the government
imposes an instantaneous Pigouvian taxation. Usually, the Pigouvian tax
is levied on the total amount of the externality (see Karp and Livernois,
1994; Benchekroun and Long, 1998; 2002, inter alia). Here, we propose an
alternative policy design, whereby the firm is subject to an instantaneous
tax equal to τb (t) , i.e., what is being taxed is indeed the rate b (t) at which
a unit of final product contributes to the increase in the stock of pollution.
The coefficient b(t) is thus a further state variable whose dynamic equation
is a linear one:
b˙(t) = −k(t) + ηb(t), (2.2)
with η > 0, and decreasing in k (t) ≥ 0, which is the instantaneous R&D
effort carried out by the firm. A plausible economic interpretation of b (t) is
to see it as the environmental obsolescence rate of technology, measuring the
2For examples of analogous approaches in literature on industrial organization, see
Klemperer and Meyer (1986) or Lambertini (2006).
3According to the Department of Economics and Social Affairs of UNO, “ongoing
deforestation accounts for about 8% of the world’s annual carbon emissions” (DESA,
2009, p. 86).
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growth rate of the external damage involved by the use of technologies that
become increasingly more polluting as time goes by.
The R&D technology used by the firm involves an instantaneous cost
measured by Γ(t) = zk2(t), where z is a positive constant. The problem for
the monopolistic firm consists in maximizing w.r.t controls k(t) and q(t) the
expected value of the following payoff functional:
J ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt((p(t)− c)q(t)− Γ(t)− τb(t))dt, (2.3)
subject to: 
b˙(t) = −k(t) + ηb(t)
S˙(t) = b(t)q(t)− δS(t)
θ(t)
b(0) = b0 > 0
S(0) = S0 > 0.
(2.4)
This is a modified (monopolistic) version of a dynamic oligopoly game with
environmental effects examined in Dragone et al. (2009). The main differ-
ences consist in (i) the presence of a shock affecting the accumulation of the
environmental externality; (ii) the functional form of the dynamics of b(t),
that here is such that the model takes a linear-quadratic form; (iii) the tax
is levied on the monopolist’s contribution to pollution and not on the overall
stock of pollution itself.
3 The monopoly optimum
The current value Hamiltonian function reads as:
H(·) = (a− c− q(t))q(t)− zk2(t)− τb(t)+ (3.1)
+λ(t)(−k(t) + ηb(t)) + µ(t)
(
b(t)q(t)− δS(t)
θ(t)
)
,
where λ(t) is the costate variable associated to the state b(t) and µ(t) is the
one associated to the other state S(t). Because of the aleatory effect, the
monopolist is supposed to maximize the expected value of the Hamiltonian,
E(H). From now on, we will drop the time argument for brevity.
What follows is the list of the necessary conditions for the maximization
of E(H), adjoint equations and transversality conditions (an application of
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Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle in a stochastic framework can be found in
Lambertini, 2005):4
∂E(H)
∂k
= −2zk − λ = 0, (3.2)
∂E(H)
∂q
= a− c− 2q + µb = 0, (3.3)
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂E(H)
∂b
= (ρ− η)λ− µq + τ, (3.4)
µ˙ = ρµ− ∂E(H)
∂S
= (ρ+ δw)µ, (3.5)
lim
t−→∞
e−ρtλ(t) = 0, lim
t−→∞
e−ρtµ(t) = 0. (3.6)
Note that in (3.5) we make use of the expected value E(θ−1) = w. By
differentiating (3.2) and (3.3) w.r.t. time, (2.4), (3.4) and (3.5) amount to
the following state-control dynamical system:
b˙ = −k + ηb
S˙ = bq − δwS
k˙ = (ρ− η)k − (a− c− 2q)q
2zb
− τ
2z
q˙ =
1
2
(−a+ c+ 2q
b
)
[−k + (η + ρ+ δw)b]
. (3.7)
Proposition 3.1. The model admits a unique steady state P ∗ = (b∗, S∗, k∗, q∗),
whose coordinates are, respectively,
b∗ =
τ
2η(ρ− η)z , S
∗ =
τ(a− c)
4η(ρ− η)zδw , k
∗ =
τ
2(ρ− η)z , q
∗ =
a− c
2
.
Proof. Solving (3.7) yields a unique stationary point P ∗, whose coordinates
are all strictly positive if ρ− η > 0.
4We omit the explicit exposition of second order conditions for a maximum as they are
satisfied by construction.
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Clearly, if ρ ∈ [0, η) , then τ must be negative in order for the vector
(b∗, S∗, k∗, q∗) to be economically meaningful. In this range, the fact that
discounting is lower than the environmental obsolescence rate entails that
the only feasible policy takes the form of a subsidy. Conversely, for all ρ > η,
τ must be positive, i.e., the regulator has to tax the firm to induce the
entrepreneur to carry out a positive amount of R&D.
Note that, while k∗ is a function of τ, q∗ is not. This immediately implies
that, by adopting this policy, the regulator is providing the firm with an
incentive to carry out R&D while leaving unaffected the choice of the optimal
monopoly output (and therefore the corresponding price level).
As a clear consequence of the dynamics of the model, the only coordinate
affected by uncertainty is S∗, i.e., the steady state level of the pollution stock
is a function of w. The Jacobian matrix of (3.7) evaluated at P ∗ is:
J(P ∗) =

η 0 −1 0
a− c
2
−δw 0 τ
2η(ρ− η)z
0 0 ρ− η η(a− c)(ρ− η)
τ
0 0 0 ρ+ δw

.
Proposition 3.2. P ∗ is a saddle point for the system (3.7).
Proof. J(P ∗) has the negative eigenvalue λ1 = −δw, and the positive eigen-
values λ2 = ρ+δw, λ3 = η and that is sufficient to deduce that P
∗ represents
a saddle point equilibrium for (3.7).
Note that, if ρ > η, the stable subspace E(P ∗) is spanned by the vector
(0, 1, 0, 0), that is, on the S-axis the time trajectory of the stock of pollution
asymptotically heads towards the level S∗.
Since the model features a single agent, there obviously exists a unique
feedback stationary strategy coinciding with the open-loop solution. In par-
ticular, the related optimal value function V (b, S) satisfying the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation is linear-quadratic in b and linear in S.
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3.1 Welfare and profit assessment
Let pi∗, CS∗ and SW ∗ be the profit, the consumer surplus and the social
welfare functions evaluated at the steady state P ∗. We have that:
pi∗ = (a− c− q∗)q∗ − z(k∗)2 − τb∗ = (a− c)
2
4
− τ
2(3η − 2ρ)
4η(ρ− η)2z , (3.8)
independent of w.
Proposition 3.3. 1. If ρ >
3η
2
, then pi∗ > 0 for every τ .
2. If 0 < ρ <
3η
2
, then:
pi∗ > 0 ∀ τ ∈
(
min
{
∓(a− c)(ρ− η)
√
ηz
3η − 2ρ
}
,
max
{
∓(a− c)(ρ− η)
√
ηz
3η − 2ρ
})
.
Proof. Trivially, the expression (3.8) is strictly positive irrespective of the
value of τ if ρ >
3η
2
, whereas if ρ <
3η
2
, the positivity is ensured if τ belongs
to the interval (−τ1, τ1), where τ1 = max±(a− c)(ρ− η)
√
ηz
3η − 2ρ.
The consumer surplus at equilibrium reads:
CS∗ =
(q∗)2
2
+ τb∗ =
(a− c)2
8
+
τ 2
2η(ρ− η)z .
Finally, the social welfare at equilibrium follows:
SW ∗ = CS∗ − S∗ + pi∗ = 3(a− c)
2
8
− τ
2
4(ρ− η)2z −
τ(a− c)
4η(ρ− η)zδw .
Proposition 3.4. SW ∗ > 0 for every τ belonging to the interval:(
min
{
−(a− c)(ρ− η)
2
(
1
ηδw
∓ z
√
1
η2z2δ2w2
+
6
z
)}
,
max
{
−(a− c)(ρ− η)
2
(
1
ηδw
∓ z
√
1
η2z2δ2w2
+
6
z
)})
.
Proof. It suffices to solve the inequality SW ∗ > 0 with respect to τ .
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4 The first best
Now we briefly expose the first best solution that would be attained if the
firm were run by a benevolent planner maximising the discounted flow of
social welfare w.r.t. q and k. The planner’s Hamiltonian is:
HP (·) = (a− c− q)q − q
2
2
− S − zk2+ (4.1)
+λ(−k + ηb) + µ
(
bq − δS
θ
)
.
Taking the necessary conditions on the expected value of HP (·) and following
the same procedure as in the previous section, we obtain the following steady
state coordinates (the subscript P stands for planner):
bP =
(a− c) (ρ+ δw)
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)
SP =
2 (a− c)2 η (ρ− η) (ρ+ δw)3 z
δw
[
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)]2
kP =
(a− c) (ρ+ δw) η
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)
qP =
2 (a− c) η (ρ− η) (ρ+ δw)2 z
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)
(4.2)
Note that all of these coordinates are affected by the shock. The associated
profits and consumer surplus are:
piP =
(a− c)2 η (2ρ− 3η) (ρ+ δw)2 z[
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)]2 (4.3)
CSP =
1
2
[
2 (a− c) η (ρ− η) (ρ+ δw)2 z
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)
]2
(4.4)
Hence, the resulting social welfare level is SWP = piP + CSP − SP . Before
proceeding any further, it is worth stressing the following straightforward
result:
Proposition 4.1. If ρ >
3η
2
, then piP > 0.
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We are now in a position to address the following question, i.e., whether
the policy maker regulating the behaviour of a profit-maximising monopolist
can design an optimal tax rate τ so as to replicate the same welfare perfor-
mance associated to the first best allocation we have just sketched. This must
be done under the non-negativity constraint concerning the firm’s profits, as
established in Proposition 3.3.1. In doing so, we shall confine our attention
to the parameter range ρ > 3η/2, in order for the palnning equilibrium to
be sustainable under our partial equilibrium appoach, i.e., in absence of any
other industrial sector that could be taxed to raise the money neccesary for
the survival of the public monopoly for all ρ ∈ [0, 3η/2) .
5 Designing the optimal taxation
The policy maker’s problem consists in solving
∆SW = SWP − SW ∗ = 0 (5.1)
w.r.t. τ, with
∆SW =
1
8
[
2τ 2
(ρ− η)2 z +
2 (a− c) τ
δη (ρ− η)wz − 3 (a− c)
2 + Ψ
]
(5.2)
where
Ψ ≡ 8η (a− c)
2 (ρ+ δw)2 z
[
2δη (ρ− η)2w (ρ+ δw)2 z − 2ρ (ρ− η)− δηw]
δ
[
1 + 2ηz (ρ+ δw)2 (ρ− η)]w
(5.3)
Equation (5.1) has two real roots in τ, τ− < 0 < τ+.5 On this basis, we can
state our final result:
Proposition 5.1. For all ρ >
3η
2
, there exist a tax (τ+) allowing the policy
maker to replicate at the monopoly equilibrium the social welfare performance
associated with the first best.
The negative solution must be discarded in view of Proposition 4.1. As
a last remark, again recollecting Proposition 3.1, it is worth pointing out
that such a policy can only reproduce the aggregate surplus created by this
5We omit the lengthy expressions of the two roots for the sake of brevity.
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industry, while the output and the R&D effort will necessarily differ across
regimes. To see this, it’s sufficient to compare q∗ against qP : while the former
is constant (and coincides with the standard output that we usually observe
in a monopoly equilibrium with the same demand and cost functions), the
latter clearly accounts for the stochastic process affecting the accumulation
of pollution. Additionally, one may observe that k∗ = kP obtains in corre-
spondence of a value of τ that does not solve (5.1).
6 Concluding remarks
In a dynamic monopoly model with environmental externalities, we have
investigated the possibility of using a tax taylored on the firm’s instantaneous
contribution to the accumulation of pollution, which is subject to a shock, the
latter being i.i.d. across instants. There exists an optimal tax rate such that
the industry exactly replicates the same steady state welfare performance as
in the first best. However, the corresponding output level, R&D investment
for green technologies and surplus distribution necessarily differ from those
characterising social planning.
An interesting extension of the foregoing analysis is the design of the same
kind of policy in an oligopoly game where each single firm might refrain from
investing in environmental friendly technologies due to the usual free riding
incentive usually associated with strategic interplay. This is left for future
research.
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